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THE COST OF CAPITAL 
IN MINNESOTA DAIRY COOPERATIVES 
INTRODUCTION 
Cooperative marketing and purchasing organizations are very important 
in Minnesota's agribusiness economy. In 1966 in Minnesota, 996 farmer co-
operatives conducted approximately $1.1 billion worth of business. 
In recent years the increased volume of business, a rising price level, and 
the introduction of new technology have increased greatly the capital require-
ment of these cooperatives. At the same time certain forces, such as increased 
competition and the 1962 Revenue Act, have tended to decrease the earnings 
available to these firms. Because retained earnings are one of the primary 
sources of capital for cooperatives, the above conditions have led some ob-
servers to hypothesize that a major problem facing cooperatives is that of 
obtaining adequate equity capital. 
On the other hand, some students of cooperation have argued that co-
operatives rely too heavily on equity capital to meet their capital require-
ments. Retained earnings, although frequently viewed as a free source of 
capital, are not free. They have an opportunity cost which may be higher to 
a cooperative than the cost of debt capital. Concerning this point, Deloach 
states that ". . . loan capital rather than owner's equity capital may be the 
most economical means of financing, especially when members find it in-
advisable or impossible to allocate additional amounts of investment capital 
to off the farm auxiliary business operations." 1 
In their book on revolving fund financing, Erdman and Larsen make 
this point: "It is probably true that the membership of most farmer's associa-
tions consists mainly of farmers who are still heavy users of credit in their 
farming operations and who will want their equity in the cooperative to cover 
only such portion of its capital as will give it high credit ratings in the eyes 
of lenders. A well-run association can often get its non equity, long term 
credit cheaper than a farmer gets his."~ For these reasons, they conclude that 
" ... it is important for the policy makers of each association to consider 
how much more equity capital it is wise to seek from members beyond the 
minimum needed to satisfy lenders providing the rest." 'l 
In view of the conflicting opinions about using equity capital, this study 
will investigate the present methods of financing agriculture cooperatives in 
Minnesota to determine if cooperatives are using the least-cost capital struc-
ture. For relatively uniform data and because of time and financial restric-
tions, the study is restricted to dairy manufacturing cooperatives in Minnesota. 
1 D. B. Deloach, "Growth of Farmer Cooperatives- Obstacles and Opportunities" Journal of 
Farm Economics, Volume XLIV, May 1962, p. 494. ' 
'Henry E. Erdman and Grace H. Larsen, Revolving Finance in Agriculture Cooperatives, p. 77. 
"Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
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The specific objectives of the study are: 
1) to analyze the methods that dairy cooperatives have used and are using 
to finance their operations; and 
2) to develop a procedure to measure the cost of capital to a cooperative 
and use this procedure to determine if Minnesota dairy cooperatives 
are using the least-cost capital structure. 
Background and Procedure of the Study 
Minnesota ranks third among the states in the production of milk.4 Be-
cause Minnesota is located far from large milk consuming markets, most of 
Minnesota's milk is processed into butter, nonfat dried milk, and cheese. 
According to a recent study, approximately 90 percent of the milk produced 
in Minnesota is marketed as manufactured dairy products." Thus, dairy manu-
facturing firms are very important in Minnesota's agribusiness economy. 
Cooperatives play a leading role in manufacturing dairy products in Min-
nesota. In 1963, of 333 butter firms in Minnesota, 297 were owned coopera-
tively and 51 of 55 butter-powder firms were cooperatives. 
For purposes of this study, two divisions of cooperatives were considered 
- butter manufacturing firms and butter-dry milk manufacturing firms. This 
division seems appropriate because the capital requirements of the butter and 
butter-powder firms differ significantly. Butter-powder manufacturing requires 
more complex operations and, therefore, more capital. These firms receive 
whole milk and manufacture butter and dried milk in the same plant. The 
spray driers and other equipment used to dry the milk are very costly capital 
facilities, and many of these firms own additional high-cost, milk assembly 
trucks and equipment. Butter manufacturing is a simpler operation involving 
less equipment. In the butter firm, milk is received and processed into butter, 
and the skim milk is transferred to another firm for drying. 
Previous research shows that there are economies to size in the dairy 
manufacturing industry. To test for relationships between size and capital 
structure, a stratified sampling procedure was used. 
Within each division, the plants were classified into four size categories, 
and a simple random sample was selected. The sample consisted of 42 of 
143 butter firms and 29 of 46 butter-powder firms.u 
The manager of each sample firm was interviewed personally, and de-
tailed financial information was obtained from each firm. 
Cooperative Principles 
Three main characteristics normally are listed as being unique to coopera-
tives: (1) operation at cost, (2) limited returns on capital, and (3) demo-
cratic control. 
'Minnesota Agricultural Statistics 1965, United States Department of Agriculture and Minnesot<• 
Department of Agriculture, March 1966, p. 4. 
'Jerome W. Hammond and Martin K. Christiansen, Marketing Minnesota's Dairy Products, Char 
acteristics, Problems and Needs, Miscellaneous Report No. 63, University of Minnesota Agricul 
tural Experiment Station, 1964, p. 8. 
• See appendix for a more detailed explanation of the sample procedure. 
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Operation at cost is a basic principle of cooperation. Since it is not pos-
sible to operate day to day on a cost basis, most marketing cooperatives 
achieve this objective by paying the going price for products and returning 
the net margins to the farmer members on a basis proportional to their pa-
tronage. These patronage refunds, as such payments are called, may be made 
in cash, or the funds may be allocated to each member and retained in the 
business. When the funds are retained in the business, each receives a certifi-
cate or some other evidence of his allocated share of the funds. Before 1962, a 
cooperative could distribute 100 percent of its net margin in this manner and 
still deduct this item from taxable income. The Revenue Act of 1962, how-
ever, requires cooperatives to pay at least 20 percent of net margins in cash 
to claim patronage refunds as a deductible item.7 
Just as any other business, cooperatives require capital to operate. The 
primary objective of a cooperative is to market farm products andjor obtain 
supplies more effectively rather than to make a profitable return on invested 
capital. Consequently, payments to capital usually are limited. This prevents 
capital from becoming the main claimant to the company's net proceeds. 
Another distinguishing feature of cooperatives is democratic control of 
the organization. Control of a cooperative is based on democratic principles 
rather than on invested capital. Democratic control usuaiiy is achieved by 
allowing each member one vote on each issue regardless of the number of 
shares he owns. In most states, laws of incorporation governing cooperatives 
stipulate that voting must be on the basis of one man one vote. Eighteen 
states, however, permit more than one vote to a member. Democratic control 
and limited returns on capital are two important factors which limit the sale 
of capital stock by cooperatives. These factors make the acquisition of equity 
capital by this method much more difficult. 
Sources of Capital 
There are two basic types of capital- equity and debt- with which a 
business can be financed. Equity capital is invested by the owners as the basic 
investment to make the enterprise possible. Equity capital is risk capital in 
the sense that an owner of the firm supplies this capital and risks incurring 
a loss or realizing a gain. Debt capital is made available to a firm by a concern 
or individual other than an owner. 
Raising funds by selling capital stock or retaining earnings increases the 
owners' claims; raising funds by borrowing increases the creditors' claims. 
The combination of equity and debt capital used by a firm in raising funds 
constitutes its capital structure. 
Equity Capital 
Capital stock 
Cooperatives, like other corporations, may sell common stock for equity 
capital. Since cooperative members benefit from the cooperative's services, 
they are responsible to help finance the cooperative. One way that a mem-
7 Raymond J. Mischler and David Volkin, How the Revenue Act of 1962 Affects Farmer Coopera· 
tives, Farmer Cooperative Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, General Report No. 105, 
October 1962. 
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ber can supply his cooperative with capital is by purchasing common stock. 
In most cooperatives, a patron must own at least one share of common 
stock to become a voting member. Although the sale of common stock is a 
source of equity capital for a cooperative, there are limitations to its use. 
The dividend amount that a cooperative may pay on capital stock is limited 
by federaJS and state laws. Moreover, common stock in a cooperative has no 
market because the bylaws of most associations require that the stock be sold 
back to the cooperative. This requirement insures that the voting rights of 
the cooperative will remain in the hands of the patrons or users. This is de-
sirable because a cooperative is formed to benefit the users. If they do not 
control the association, the benefits they seek may not materialize or may 
accrue to others. 
Another factor limiting the sale of common stock by cooperatives is the 
lack of potential appreciation in the stock's value. In a general corporation, 
the value of common stock usually appreciates as earnings increase. Because 
a cooperative's earnings are distributed to patrons rather than to stock in-
vestors, this appreciation potential does not exist. 
Preferred stock, another type of equity security used by cooperatives, 
normally draws a fixed dividend rate. Although usually nonvoting, preferred 
stock has claim to assets before common stock if the association liquidates. 
The same limitations apply to preferred stock as to common stock, except 
that preferred stock may be sold to nonmembers. 
Retained earnings 
Cooperatives, like other firms, may generate capital by retaining earnings. 
Some important differences exist in the use of retained earnings by coopera-
tives and other firms. 
In most cooperatives, retained earnings are allocated to each member on 
the basis of his patronage. One reason for this is that retained earnings, if 
they are to be excluded from taxable income, must be allocated to the patrons. 
The second reason is that cooperative members and management believe that 
a member's investment should be proportionate to his patronage. Retaining 
earnings and allocating them according to patronage is an easy way to ac-
complish this objective. 
Cooperatives also differ from other corporations in the extent to which 
they use retained earnings. A recent, thorough study of farmer cooperatives 
in the U. S. shows that 71 percent of the equity capital was generated by 
authorized deduction from the proceeds when products were sold or by re-
taining part of the earnings. Only 15 percent of the equity capital was ob-
tained by sale of capital stock. D 
As previously mentioned, cooperatives rely heavily on retained earnings 
because small returns and little chance for capital gain limit the marketability 
of cooperative stock. Moreover, most cooperatives do not pay any dividends 
on retained earnings. Therefore, the explicit costs of retained earnings are 
less than the cost of preferred stock or debt which involves fixed dividends 
s Capper Volstead Act limits dividend on stock to 8 percent. 
D Helim H. Hulbert, Nelda Griffin, and Kelsey B. Gardner, Methods of Financing Farmer Cooper-
atives, Farm Cooperative Service, General Report 32 USDA, Washington, D.C. 
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and interest payments. It will be shown, however, that when all factors are 
considered, retained earnings may not be the cheapest source of capital. 
Capital retains 
Some cooperatives also obtain equity capital by capital or product retains. 
In this method, the patron authorizes the cooperative to retain capital based 
on the dollar value or physical volume of products marketed through the co-
operative. For example, members of a dairy cooperative may authorize a 
deduction of 5 cents from the price of each 100 pounds of milk they market 
through the cooperative and add it to a revolving fund. 
Revolving fund method of handling retained earnings 
Distributing earnings to patrons is unique to the cooperative form of 
organization. Since cooperative members expect to share the benefits in pro-
portion to their patronage, members should contribute capital in proportion 
to their patronage. To do this, many cooperatives use the revolving fund 
method of financing. "Essentially the revolving plan of financing is one where 
capital supplied by the current year's patrons, either by authorized deductions 
or from savings and margins realized in operations, is used to retire the oldest 
outstanding revolving fund capital furnished an association by patrons of 
earlier years." 10 The revolving fund does not enter the revolving phase until 
the patrons have supplied the amount of capital needed. Figure 1 shows how 
1967 
$26,000 
1966 
1965 $24,000 
$22,000 1966 
1965 $24,000 
1964 1964 $22,000 Retained 
$20,000 $20,000 
1965 
1963 1963 1963 1964 $22,000 
$18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $20,000 
1962 I 1962 1962 1962 1963 1964 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $18,000 $20,000 
1962 1963 } $16,000 $18,000 Retired 
Figure 1. Revolving plan of a farmer cooperative. 
1
" Helim H. Hulbert, Nelda Griffin, and Kelsey B. Gardner, Revolving Fund Method of Financing 
Farmer Cooperatives, Farmer Cooperatives Service, General Report No. 41, p. 1, USDA, Wash-
Ington, D.C., March 1958. 
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a revolving plan operates in a growing cooperative. In 1962, the first year 
of the revolving plan, $16,000 of earnings were retained and added to the 
revolving fund. From 1963 to 1965, earnings of $18 ,000, $20,000, and 
$22,000 respectively were added to the revolving fund. By 1966, the associa-
tion had retained all the capital it required, and 1962 earnings were retired. 
Each year thereafter, the oldest retained earnings were retired. 
Most cooperative leaders consider the revolving fund the most equitable 
method of financing a growing cooperative because it combines the following 
three principles: 
1. continued investment, according to use, by members and patrons in the 
capital structure of the cooperative; 
2. continued accumulation of capital from year to year by the cooperative; 
3. continued retirement of member's and patron's oldest outstanding 
capital first. 
A member may invest his capital in several ways in the revolving fund of 
his cooperative. The most common method is to permit the cooperative to 
retain the earnings . Also, members can contribute capital to the revolving 
fund by authorizing the association to deduct specific amounts from sales 
proceeds . 
The revolving fund method of financing ensures that members invest in 
their cooperative in proportion to patronage. In addition, this method helps 
assure that ownership is maintained by current members. (This is important in 
maintaining tax exempt status.) 
Control module of a modern milk evaporator and drier is an exa mple of 
automated dairy equipment requiring increased ca pital. 
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Cooperative managers and boards of directors find the revolving plan easy 
and convenient for building capital. However, this also may be a disadvantage 
because the ease with which capital can be raised under this plan may lead 
to poor investments. The out-of-pocket costs for this source of capital are 
less than those associated with other sources. (Very few cooperatives pay any 
interest on revolving capital.) Therefore, management and directors may be 
tempted to overuse this source of capital. 
Debt Capital 
Although most of their capital is obtained from member patrons, coopera-
tives do have access to and use varying amounts of debt capital. A study pub-
lished in 1957 by the Farmer Cooperative Service 11 estimates that 25 percent 
of the capital structure of all cooperatives in the United States is debt capital. 
Table 1 shows that cooperatives obtain capital from many different 
sources. 
Table 1. Distribution of debt, 448 regional cooperatives, 1962 
Source of debt % of total 
--------------------------
Bank for Cooperatives 
Individuals ......... . 
Commercial banks ............... . 
Other farmer cooperatives 
Other sources 
Sources not reported 
Source: Engberg, op. cit., p. 31. 
60 
20 
11 
4 
3 
2 
The Bank for Cooperatives was the most important credit source for the 
cooperatives, accounting for 60 percent of the total borrowed capital. 
The second most important source of debt capital was individuals. This 
capital was obtained by direct loans or through sales of debenture bonds and 
certificates of indebtedness. 
Commercial banks provided 11 percent of the borrowed capital used by 
the cooperatives studied. 
The Cost of Capital 
Capital is an input for the firm just as labor and packaging materials are 
inputs. Just as the firm seeks to minimize the cost of labor and packaging 
materials for a given output, it should seek to minimize the cost of capital. 
A major purpose of this study is to show the relevant considerations in measur-
ing the cost of capital for a cooperative. Throughout the discussion and analy-
n Hulbert et a!., op. cit. 
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sis, it was assumed that, as cooperative principles assert, the cooperative's 
objective is to maximize returns and minimize costs to its members. 
Common stock 
It has been shown that no market exists for common stock of a coopera-
tive and that the earnings of a cooperative are distributed on the basis of 
patronage rather than investment. Thus, earnings per share and market price 
are not relevant in determining the cost of common stock in cooperatives.1:! 
In general, common stock is not sold by cooperatives to raise capital, but the 
purchase of common stock is required for voting purposes. In a cooperative, 
the relevant factor for cost of common stock capital is the member's oppor-
tunity cost on his capital. 
Preferred stock 
Some cooperatives use preferred stock to raise capital. Usually preferred 
stock is issued with a fixed dividend rate. This type of stock generally has no 
maturity date, no voting rights, and no cumulation of unpaid dividend privi-
lege. The cost of preferred stock is the rate of dividend that must be paid to 
encourage investors to purchase the stock. 
Retained earnings 
For retained earnings, the opportunity cost of the member's capital is the 
relevant cost. In other words, what could the farmer earn on the retained 
earnings if they were returned to him? To establish the opportunity cost, an 
estimate of the marginal rate of return on farm capital is necessary. For the 
analysis in this study, the price that Minnesota farmers pay for short-term 
credit is considered the minimum opportunity cost. 
Debt capital 
The Banks for Cooperatives were established specifically to lend to co-
operatives, and they are the major source of debt capital for cooperatives. 
Thus, the rate charged by the Banks for Cooperatives is a reasonable estimate 
of the cost of debt capital for cooperatives. 
THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF MINNESOTA DAIRY 
COOPERATIVES: ANALYSIS AND TRENDS 
This section presents the current situation in dairy cooperative financing 
in Minnesota and analyzes the changes in asset requirements and capital struc-
ture during the last 15 years. 
Asset Requirements 
Many changes have taken place in the Minnesota dairy industry during 
the time period covered by this study. Considerable change has been caused 
12 For a discussion of how these factors enter into the computation of the cost of common sto<;k 
for a general corporation see Ezra Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management, Columbia 
University Press, pp. 37-50. 
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by new technology in dairy processing. This technology has required signifi-
cant increases in capital investment by cooperatives. Examples are the instal-
lation of larger churns and separators; spray dryers; high-temperature, short-
time pasteurizers; and in-place cleaning systems, each requiring large capital 
outlays. The shift from can delivery to bulk delivery has forced cooperatives 
to invest in new equipment, such as pumping equipment, large over-the-road 
tank trucks, and washing facilities for cleaning tank trucks. In addition, most 
cooperatives still receive some milk in cans, forcing them to maintain their 
can receiving equipment. 
Another factor which has increased cooperative capital requirements is 
vertical integration forward into wholesale and retail market channels. Many 
dairy cooperatives find it advantageous to affiliate themselves with another 
cooperative. Many local cooperatives market all or some of their products 
through larger cooperatives. By integrating forward into marketing channels, 
these cooperatives obtain economies in functions such as product promotion, 
transportation, storage, and, in some cases, retailing not otherwise obtainable. 
Some locals are direct members or affiliates of large, regional cooperatives 
such as Land 0' Lakes, Inc., North Star Dairy, and Northern Cooperatives, 
Inc. Other locals are member plants of larger cooperatives which, in turn, 
are affiliated with one of the large, regional dairy cooperatives. 
Investment in other cooperatives, a measure of integration, usually is not 
a direct cash investment by the participating cooperative. This investment re-
sults from doing business with another cooperative which distributes its 
retained earnings in investment credits. Investment in other cooperatives for 
the 71 sample firms increased from $2,684,314 in 1950 to $11,628,295 in 
1965, an increase of about 333 percent. 
Table 2 presents the sample firms' investment in other cooperatives for 
19 50 and 1965. Average investment in other cooperatives increased signi-
cantly for both types of cooperatives. The percentage increase was greater 
for butter firms than for butter-powder firms, however. 
Table 2. Average investment in other cooperatives, 71 Minnesota 
daily cooperatives, 1950 and 1965 
Type of Number Percent 
cooperative of firms 1950 1965 change 
(dollars) 
Butter-powder 29 47,804 203,658 326 
Butter ................. 42 30,903 136,243 341 
Butter firms must market their skim milk through other firms. Because 
most firms with drying facilities in Minnesota are cooperatives, it was hy-
pothesized that investment in other cooperatives as a percentage of total assets 
would- be greater for butter firms than for butter-powder firms. There was a 
'tatistically significant difference at the 5 percent level of significance in in-
\'estment in other cooperatives between the two types of firms. 
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Table 3 shows investment in other cooperatives as a percentage of total 
assets for the sample firms. 
Table 3. Investment in other cooperatives as a percentage of total assets, 
71 Minnesota dairy cooperatives, 1950 and 1965 
Type of Number Percent 
cooperative of firms 1950 1965 change 
(percent) 
Butter-powder ................ 29 10.4 13.5 33.6 
Butter ......... 42 24.6 38.2 55.2 
The number of dairy cooperatives in Minnesota declined sharply in the 
period covered by this study, but the volume of business increased signifi-
cantly. In 1950 in Minnesota, 552 dairy cooperatives conducted a gross volume 
of business of $191.6 million. In 1963-64 in Minnesota, 382 dairy coopera-
tives had a gross volume of $340.2 million. The 71 sample firms increased 
their total sales from $55.7 million in 1950 to $189.8 million in 1965. The 
average total sales per firm for the 29 butter-powder firms increased from 
$1.3 million in 1950 to $4.9 million in 1965. In butter firms, average sales 
per firm increased from $436,820 in 1950 to $1.1 million in 1965. Average 
assets per firm increased from $457,606 in 1950 to $1.5 million in 1965 for 
butter-powder firms and from $123,023 in 1950 to $356,393 in 1965 for 
butter firms. 
Sources of Funds 
How have Minnesota dairy cooperatives financed this large growth? A 
firm can finance itself internally or externally. The internal method involves 
depreciation and retained earnings, and the external method involves selling 
capital stock and borrowing. A firm's capital structure results from the 
methods chosen for financing. 
Capital Strl!cture of the Sample Firms 
Several characteristics concerning capital stock are unique to cooperatives. 
Contrary to the situation in most corporations, the majority of the capital 
stock of cooperatives is held by member patrons. According to cooperative 
law, the purchase of one share of common stock is required for membership. 
In years past, however, particularly when cooperatives were first organized, 
members were asked to purchase more than one share if possible. Thus, many 
members owned several hundred dollars worth of common stock in their 
associations. Capital requirements on the farm have increased to the point 
where members generally are reluctant to invest more than the absolute mini-
mum in their cooperative. Thus, the prevailing pattern is for a member to 
own only one share of common stock. This accounts for a declining impor-
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tance of common stock in the capital structure of most cooperatives. As old 
members retire, their common stock amounting to several hundred dollars 
in many cases is retired, and most new members purchase only one share. 
In addition, many cooperatives have lowered the par value of their com-
mon stock to make membership easier to obtain . In 1950 the range of the 
par value of common stock for butter-powder plants was $1.00 to $100.00, 
and the modal value was $10. 00. In 1965 the range was $1.00 to $25.00, 
and modal value was $1.00. For butter firms, the range of the par value for 
common stock in 1950 was $1.00 to $75.00, and the modal value was 
$10.00. In 1965 the modal value was $1.00, and the range was $1.00 to 
$25.00. Thus, a lower par value of common stock accounts for a large part 
of the declining importance of common stock in the capital structure. 
Another factor which may affect the amount of the capital structure in 
capital stock is the dividend rate. Many of the sample firms did not pay any 
dividend on common or preferred stock. Moreover, the number of coopera-
tives paying a dividend on common stock declined during the study period. 
In 1950, nine butter-powder firms paid a dividend on common stock, while 
in 1965 only four did so. Three butter-powder firms paid a dividend on pre-
ferred stock in 1950, and five paid a dividend in 1965. 
In 1950, 25 butter firms, or 54 percent, paid a dividend on common 
stock, whereas in 1965, only eight, or 19 percent, paid a dividend. T he num-
ber of butter firms paying a dividend on preferred stock increased fro m three 
in 1950 to five in 1965. 
New types of dairy equipment. such as continuou s churn s and soft butter 
printers, have great ly increased capital required in dairy cooperatives. 
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Capital structure of butter-powder firms 
Tables 4 and 5 show the absolute and percentage distribution of the capi-
tal structure of the 29 butter-powder firms. 
The role of common stock in the capital structure of the butter-powder 
association is decreasing. In 1950, common stock accounted for 2.2 percent 
of the capital structure, but in 1965, it accounted for only 1.2 percent. The 
role of preferred stock declined even more, from 32.7 percent in 1950 to 13.9 
percent in 1965. This may be because many of the cooperatives formerly is-
sued their patronage refunds in preferred stock and no longer do so. In fact, 
most of the sample cooperatives were retiring their preferred stock. Retained 
earnings now are added to the patron's equity reserve account, and book 
credits are issued instead of stock certificates. This method is much simpler 
and cheaper. 
Patron's equity reserve (P.E.R.) is the account used by most Minnesota 
dairy cooperatives for retained earnings. The retained earnings allocated to 
each member on the basis of patronage are added to the P.E.R. account. 
Under the revenue law, the member must be notified in writing of his share 
in the retained earnings. The P.E.R. account in nearly all of the sample co-
operatives is handled on a revolving basis. Patron's equity reserve as a per-
centage of total capital increased every year except 1965. This item, account-
ing for 70.9 percent of the total in 1965, is by far the most important com-
ponent of the capital structure of butter-powder firms. 
The general reserve account may be allocated or unallocated. Unallocated 
additions to the general reserve account are subject to income taxes, however. 
The general reserve component of the capital stock remained relatively con-
stant during the study period. 
Equity as a percentage of the capital structure increased every year ex-
cept 1965. Even with its decrease from 1964 to 1965, equity still accounted 
for 90.5 percent of total capital in 1965. Equity as a percentage of total capi-
tal structure for all U. S. manufacturing corporations has been estimated at 
about 80 percent in 1964. 1:1 
Long-term debt declined in importance in every time period except from 
1964 to 1965, when it increased from 6.0 percent to 9.5 percent. This com-
pares to 19 percent for 449 regional cooperatives. 11 Minnesota butter-powder 
cooperatives do not employ debt capital to as great an extent as regional co-
operatives do. 
Capital structure of butter firms 
Common stock is not a very large component of the capital structure ol 
butter firms, and it has been steadily declining during the study period (table' 
6 and 7). Common stock accounted for 14.2 percent of the capital structmT 
in 1950 and only 2 percent in 1965. 
The preferred stock component of the capital structure of butter firm0 
was relatively constant over this period. 
'"Pearson Hunt, Charles M. Williams, and Gordon Donaldson, Basic Business Finance, 1966. P· 10. 
11 Nelda Griffin, Financial Structure of Regional Farmer Cooperatives, Farmer Cooperative Service 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, General Report No. 133, p. 8. 
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Table 4. Capital structure, 29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
(dollars) 
Common stock . . . . . . . . . . 222,569 290,619 518,462 539,993 515,334 478,170 401,220 
Preferred stock ......... 3,248,343 2,291,842 5,013,629 4,831,586 4,635,056 4,418,945 4,610,473 
Patron's equity reserve ... 4,295,616 8,068,279 16,292,202 18,374,586 20,382,440 22,253,039 23,498,244 
General reserve ......... 574,909 669,051 1,110,210 1,193,016 1,278,128 1,394,990 1,494,215 
-----
Total equity . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,341,437 11,319,791 22,934,503 24,938,849 26,810,958 28,545,144 30,004,152 
Term debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,577,237 1,731,704 2,550,149 2,564.249 2,101,182 1,827,437 3,132,347 
Total capital .... ........ 9,918,674 13,051,495 25,484,652 27,503,098 28,912,140 30,372,581 33,136,499 
Source: Survey data . 
....... 
Ul 
Table 5. Percentage distribution of the capital structure, 29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
(percent) 
Common stock 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.2 
Preferred stock .... 32.7 17.6 19.7 17.6 16.0 14.5 13.9 
Patron's equity reserve .. 43.4 61.8 63.9 66.8 70.5 73.3 70.9 
General reserve 5.8 5.1 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.5 
Total equity . . ........ 84.1 86.7 90.0 90.7 92.7 94.0 90.5 
Term debt .. 15.9 13.3 10.0 9.3 7.3 6.0 9.5 
Total capital 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Survey data. 
Table 6. Capital structure, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 
Common stock 
Preferred stock 
1950 
511,324 
208,234 
Patron's equity reserve .. 2,212,944 
General reserve . . . . . . . . 637,319 
Total equity . . . . . . . . . . . 3,569,821 
Term debt . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,540 
Total capital ........... 13,592,361 
Source: Survey data. 
1955 
455,559 
438,129 
3,991,497 
589,999 
5,475,184 
414,329 
5,889,513 
1961 
(dollars) 
470,039 
720,816 
6,853,158 
739,555 
8,783,568 
458,687 
9,242,255 
1962 
321,842 
712,149 
7,527,480 
754,161 
9,315,632 
249,979 
9,565,611 
1963 
278,514 
664,219 
7,987,106 
766,296 
9,696,135 
312,033 
10,008,168 
1964 
253,036 
757,107 
8,525,238 
752,935 
10,288,316 
539,045 
10,827,361 
1965 
233,702 
741,868 
8,930,022 
756,878 
10,662,470 
1,058,793 
11,721,263 
Table 7. Percentage distribution of the capital structure, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 
Common stock 
Preferred stock ..... . 
Patron's equity reserve 
General reserve 
Total equity .............. . 
Term debt ............... . 
Total capital ... 
Source: Sur'Je::/ data. 
1950 
14.2 
5.8 
61.7 
17.7 
99.4 
.6 
100.0 
1955 
7.7 
7.4 
67.9 
10.0 
93.0 
7.0 
100.0 
1961 
5.1 
7.8 
74.1 
8.0 
95.0 
5.0 
100.0 
1962 
(percent) 
3.4 
7.4 
78.7 
7.9 
97.4 
2.6 
100.0 
1963 
2.8 
6.6 
79.8 
7.7 
96.9 
3.1 
100.0 
1964 
2.3 
7.0 
78.7 
7.0 
95.0 
5.0 
100.0 
1965 
2.0 
6.3 
76.2 
6.5 
91.0 
9.0 
100.0 
Patron's equity reserve increased from 61.7 percent of total capital in 
1950 to 76.2 percent in 1965. This component reached 79.8 percent in 1963 
and declined in each of the last two periods to 76.2 percent in 1965. This 
compares with 70.9 percent for butter-powder firms in 1965. 
The decrease in patron's equity reserve which occurred in the last two 
periods was offset by increases in long-term debt, which increased substanti-
ally from .6 percent in 1950 to 9.0 percent in 1965. Although long-term 
debt, as a proportion of total capital, increased during the study period for 
butter plants, it decreased for butter-powder plants. 
The capital structure of butter firms is similar to that of butter-powder 
firms in that common stock as a percentage of total capital declined signifi-
cantly during the study period. 
Preferred stock was a much larger component of the structure of butter-
powder firms than of butter firms. 
The most important characteristic of the capital structure of the two types 
of firms, and the characteristic which has important implications for this 
study, is the large proportion of total capital accounted for by equity. Be-
tween 1961 and 1965, equity as a percentage of total capital averaged 91.6 
for butter-powder firms and 95.1 for butter firms. 
Capital Structure and Size of Firm 
According to previous studies of the dairy manufacturing industry, certain 
operational procedures and results are related to size. This led to the hy-
pothesis that different size firms have different capital structures and follow 
different financial practices. 
To test the hypothesis that capital structure varies with the firm size, the 
percentage distribution of each firm's capital structure was computed and av-
eraged for the period 1961 to 1965. The firms were divided into size groups 
according to the criteria in the appendix. The analysis of variance technique 
revealed that, at the .05 level of significance, no statistically significant differ-
ence existed in the capital structure of the different size groups of firms. Thus, 
this part of the hypothesis was rejected. 
Preliminary analysis revealed that debt as a percentage of total capital 
averaged considerably less for large butter-powder firms than for small firms. 
This led to the hypothesis that large firms use less debt than small firms. This 
is consistent with economic theory because one would expect larger firms to 
have higher earnings and, thus, be more able to finance themselves from 
earnings. To test this hypothesis, the analysis of variance technique was used 
to see if there was a significant difference among size groups in the mean 
values of debt as a percentage of total capital. No significant difference was 
found at the .05 level of significance. Table 8 shows the average of debt as 
a percentage of total capital for butter-powder firms. In each of the three 
largest groups, at least one firm did not have any debt during the 5-year 
period. Although there was no statistically significant difference in the use 
of debt by size groups of butter-powder firms, in 1965 only two of the seven 
largest firms had long-term debt. Three firms in this group did not have any 
long-term debt during the entire period 1961-65. 
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Table 8. Average and range of debt as a percentage of total capital, 
29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 1961-65 
======== 
Size 
group''' 
II 
Ill 
IV 
'~ For size intervals, see appendix. 
Averaget 
19.9 
6.7 
13.9 
4.7 
Range 
(percent) 
2.9. 55.9 
0. 19.6 
0. 37.5 
0. 19.7 
t No significant difference among means at the .05 level of significance. 
In addition, debt as a percentage of total capital for butter-powder firms 
decreased from a high of 15.9 percent in 1950 to 9.5 percent in 1965. Equity 
increased from 84.1 to 90.5 percent of capital during the same period. This 
indicates that, in general, the equity position of butter-powder firms increased 
during the study period. 
Statistical tests revealed no statistically significant difference in the use of 
debt among size groups of butter firms. During the study period, debt as a 
percentage of total capital for all butter cooperatives increased from .6 in 
19 50 to 9.0 in 1965. Even at its low point, however, equity as a percentage 
of total capital was 91.0. 
Capital Structure and Type of Firm 
Although capital structure did not vary with size of firm, analysis of vari-
ance showed a significant difference between the capital structure of butter 
and butter-powder firms. Table 9 shows the percentage distribution of the 
1961-65 average capital structure of the two types of firms. 
Table 9. Percentage distribution of the 1961-65 average capital 
structure, 29 Minnesota butter-powder and 42 Minnesota 
butter cooperatives 
Item Butter-powder 
Common stock 1.7 
Preferred stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 
Patron's equity reserve 
General reserve 
Total equity 
Term debt 
Total .................... . 
69.2 
4.4 
91.6 
8.4 
100.0 
18 
(percent) 
Butter 
3.1 
7.0 
77.6 
7.4 
95.1 
4.9 
100.0 
Preferred stock was 16.3 percent of the capital structure of butter-powder 
firms and only 7.0 percent for butter firms. This was mainly because many 
butter-powder firms, at one time or another, distributed their patronage re-
funds as preferred stock. The sale of preferred stock to raise capital is not a 
widely used method by either type of cooperative. 
The patron's equity reserve proportion of total capital increased in every 
period between 1961 and 1965 for butter firms and between 1964 and 1965 
for butter-powder firms. 
Why has the use of long-term debt relative to retained earnings increased? 
Either the rate of earnings has decreased or the percentage of earnings re-
tained has decreased or the amount of investment required for each dollar of 
sales has increased. 
To determine which of these factors caused the relative decrease in re-
tained earnings of the sample firms, we will examine over time earnings per 
dollar of sales, investment per dollar of sales, and the distribution of earnings. 
Earnings and Investment Per Dollar of Sales 
Table 10 shows earnings per dollar of sales. Earnings per dollar of sales 
do not display a definite trend over time. The evidence does not suggest that 
decreased earnings per dollar of sales are a factor causing the declining pro-
portion of retained earnings. 
Table 10. Earnings per dollar of sales, 71 Minnesota dairy 
cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Type of 
cooperative 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 1964 
(percent) 
Butter-powder 1.2 3.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.0 
Butter ............ 2.1 3.2 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.8 
1965 
3.0 
2.6 
Increased investment per dollar of sales could account for the rising im-
portance of debt as a percentage of total capital. Table 11 shows investment 
per dollar of sales for the sample firms. Investment as a percentage of sales 
for butter-powder firms decreased from 3 6 in 19 50 to 31 in 1965. During 
Table 11. Investment per dollar of sales, 71 Minnesota 
dairy cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Type of 
cooperative 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
(percent) 
Butter-powder ......... 36 35 22 29 30 29 31 
Butter ............... 29 28 29 30 31 32 33 
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this period, investment as a percentage of sales for butter firms increased from 
29 in 1950 to 33 in 1965. Increasing investment per dollar of sales may have 
been one factor accounting for increased use of debt by butter firms. 
Distribution of Net Margins 
The distribution of net margins was studied to determine if the proportion 
of margins retained by the sample cooperatives increased during the sample 
period. 
Generally the by-laws and/or articles of incorporation specify the details 
for determining and assigning margins to members. The board of directors, 
however, may determine how much of the net margin to pay in cash and how 
much to retain in the business. One important factor is the firm's need for 
capital. If the firm needs capital to invest in new facilities or to maintain 
present facilities, it likely will retain the maximum amount of earnings. If, on 
the other hand, the firm has little need for new investment capital, a higher 
percentage of earnings will be distributed in cash. Competition may limit the 
cooperative's ability to finance itself by retaining earnings. If a firm is in an 
area where competition for milk is rigorous, it may have to pay such a high 
price for milk that the net margins at the end of the year will be very small. ln 
some cases, a conflict between the manager and the board of directors exists 
concerning net margin policy. Several managers reported that although they 
wanted to retain as large a net margin as possible to have funds to work with, 
the board preferred to minimize net margins by paying out as high a price as 
possible. 
A very important factor affecting the distribution of net margins is the 
1962 Revenue Act. This Act requires that, to exclude patronage refunds from 
income taxes, cooperatives must distribute at least 20 percent of the patronage 
refunds in cash. 
The data show that the sample firms have, in general, been retaining a 
smaller percentage of earnings in recent years, primarily because of the 1962 
Revenue Act. Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15 show the absolute and percentage 
distribution of net margins for the two types of sample firms. The proportion 
of net margins that butter-powder firms distributed as cash in 1963 was less 
than 20 percent. One reason for this is that the law was effective for fiscal 
years beginning after December 31, 1962. For some cooperatives, the fiscal 
year 1963 began in late 1962, a·nd they were not required to pay 20 percent 
of fiscal 1963 margins. Another reason is that, in calculating the 20 percent 
payout, certain items such as dividend payments and employee bonuses are 
deductible. 
The proportion of net margins distributed as cash for butter-powder firms 
increased from a low of . 7 percent in 1961 and 1962 to 3 7.4 percent in 1965. 
The proportion of earnings retained and added to the P.E.R. account de-
creased from a high of 95.3 percent in 1962 to 60.5 percent in 1965. The 
practice of paying dividends on capital stock declined during the study period, 
as is evidenced by the declining proportion of net margins distributed in such 
dividends. 
In contrast to the action of butter-powder firms, butter firms paid out a 
relatively large proportion of net margin in cash during each period. It was 
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Table 12. Distribution of net margins, 29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 
(dollars) 
Cash ...... - ........... 44,938 56,995 22,524 22,827 431,729 
Patron's equity reserve 332,186 1,921,005 2,725,389 3,023,397 2,641,651 
Dividends ........ 10,686 22,671 31,453 28,446 33,551 
General reserve ......... 27,307 55,593 93,313 77,375 88,431 
Other ........... 29,572 2,272 36,028 22,025 26,854 
Total ........ 444,689 2,058,536 2,903,707 3,174,070 3,222,216 
Source: Survey data. 
Table 13. Percentage distribution of net margins, 29 Minnesota 
butter-powder cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 
(percent) 
Cash ....... 10.1 2.8 .7 .7 13.4 
Patron's equity reserve. 74.7 93.3 93.8 95.3 82.0 
Dividends 2.4 1.1 1.1 .9 1.1 
General reserve 6.1 2.7 3.2 2.4 2.7 
Other 6.7 .1 1.2 .7 .8 
Total ......... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Survey data. 
1964 
1,048,635 
2,944,162 
35,181 
91,904 
22,764 
4,142,646 
1964 
25.3 
71.1 
.8 
2.2 
.6 
100.0 
1965 
1,604,924 
2,593,495 
17,400 
53,406 
18,807 
4,288,032 
1965 
37.4 
60.5 
.4 
1.3 
.4 
100.0 
Table 14. Distribution of net margins, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
(percent) 
Cash .... ........ 110,783 141,759 206,999 219,980 300,900 382,175 351,161 
Patron's equity reserve 188,600 689,794 795,518 963,311 800,248 855,819 779,960 
Dividend ...... 30,436 16,139 14,896 14,666 12,001 5,135 4,341 
General reserve 23,120 5,762 5,581 2,316 -(905) 653 6,992 
Other ....... 37,063 19,217 1,510 1,534 1,420 3,088 2,717 
Total 390,002 872,671 1,024,499 1,201,807 1,113,664 1,246,870 1,145,171 
Source: Survey data. 
N 
N 
Table 15. Percentage distribution of net margins, 42 Minnesota butter plant cooperatives, 7 selected years 
Item 1950 1955 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
(percent) 
Cash 28.4 16.2 20.2 18.3 27.0 30.7 30.7 
Patron's equity reserve .. 48.4 79.0 77.6 80.2 71.9 68.5 68.1 
Dividend 7.8 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.1 .4 .4 
General reserve 5.9 .7 .5 .2 -(.1) .1 .6 
Other ....... 9.5 2.2 .1 .1 .1 .3 .2 
Total ............... - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Survey data. 
hypothes ized that butter-powder firms retained more of their earn ings because 
the ir capital requirements were increas ing more rapidly. To test thi s hypothe-
sis, each firm's average rate of growth of assets from 1955 to 1965 was cal-
cu lated . The average rate of growth of assets for butter-powder firms was 13.8 
percent compared to 8.6 percent for butter firms. Analysis of va riance re-
vea led tha t a statistica ll y significant difference between the e two means ex-
isted at the .05 level of significance. Thus, one factor causing a higher pro-
portion of retained ea rnings by butter-powder firms was the greater need for 
capital investment. 
In summary, the proportion of ea rnings distributed as cash by both types 
of firms has increased significantly in recent years. There is little doubt that 
the primary factor which caused earnings to be retained at a smaller percent-
age of the total capita l structure was the increased cash distribution of net 
margins. The 1962 tax law unquestionab ly made it more difficult for coopera-
tives to generate net worth by retaining earn ings. Cooperatives wi ll have to 
depend more on other sources of capita l in the future. This emphas izes the 
need for a study about the relative costs of different sources of capital. 
Revolving Fund Financing 
All ample firms employed the revolving fund method of financing. Only 
40 of the 71 sa mple firms (56 percent) actua lly revolved capita l in 1965. 
T he ave rage length of the revolving period for these 40 firms was 10.71 years . 
Mo t of the cooperatives using the revolving plan operated by returning 
the oldest capital first. There were, however, some interesting variat ions. Two 
cooperative retired a given percentage of their total patron's equity each year. 
For exa mple, if their total P .E.R . wa $ 100,000, they would retire 10 percent 
Investment in larger capacity equipment, such as this large barrel churn 
be ing emptied , ca ll s for much more capita l. 
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of this amount. This method allows some of every member's capital to be 
retired each year and thus gives each member a feeling of participation in 
payments. A few other cooperatives, instead of retiring all of 1 year's capital, 
retired half of 2 years' or a third of 3 years' capital. This allows the distribu-
tion of the money available for retirement of capital to more members. These 
variations suggest that managers and boards of directors are responding to 
pressure from the members to retire capital faster. 
Butter-powder firms 
Nineteen of 29, or 65.5 percent, of butter-powder cooperatives revolved 
some capital in 1965. The average length of the revolving period was 9.6 
years. Table 16 shows a frequency distribution of the length of the revolving 
period for these 18 cooperatives (one of the 19 revolved a percentage of out-
standing equity rather than the oldest capital). 
The shortest revolving period used by a butter-powder cooperative was 
4 years and the longest 1 7 years. The most common length of the revolving 
period was 10 years. 
Table 16. Length of revolving capital period, 18 Minnesota 
butter-powder cooperatives, 1965 
Length of 
revolving period 
(years) 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
13 
17 
Number of cooperatives 
1 
1 
2 
3 
2 
5 
1 
1 
2 
How many firms revolved regularly over the study period? What is the 
nature of the revolving pattern since 1950? Table 17 shows the revolving 
pattern of the 29 butter-powder cooperatives. 
Ten cooperatives, or 34 percent, did not revolve any capital during the 
study period. Six cooperatives revolved some capital in every year of the 
study period, and five more revolved capital in all of the last 5 years. In 1950, 
only eight of the 29 cooperatives revolved capital, but in 1965, 18 revolved 
capital. This is an improvement in the number of firms making payments, 
but tells nothing about the length of the revolving period. 
The average length of the revolving period for butter-powder firms which 
were revolving in 1950 was 7 years. The average length of the revolving 
period for butter-powder firms revolving in 1965 was 9.6 years, an increase 
of 2.6 years. This suggests that these cooperatives are having trouble meeting 
current capital requirements and revolving their capital on a regular schedule. 
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Table 17. Revolving pattern, 29 Minnesota butter-powder 
cooperatives, 6 selected years 
Number of cooperatives 1950 1961 1962 
-----------------------------
10 ............. . 
6 :!;: 
5 .............. . 
2 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 :;: 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 
1 :;; 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
•·· Indicates that old equities were retired in that year. 
- Indicates that old equities were not retired. 
;;( ::~ 
::: :;: 
::: 
::: 
:;: 
... 
1963 1964 
::~ ::: 
:j: . .. 
:;: :;: 
::: :;: 
... . .. 
., 
:;: 
1965 
:j: 
::: 
... 
... 
:;: 
... 
... 
:;: 
Increased capital requirements, no doubt, are part of the cause. These re-
quirements coupled with increased cash distribution of earnings, have made 
it difficult for cooperatives to retain enough earnings to meet current require-
ments and revolve old equities. 
Is the size of firm related to the revolving pattern? Six of the 10 butter-
powder firms which revolved no capital during the study period were in the 
smallest group, and one was in the largest group. The average length of the 
revolving period was longest, 10.8 years, for the largest group of plants. How-
ever, analysis of variance reveals that no significant difference existed in the 
average length of the revolving period among groups. 
Table 18 shows the amount added, amount paid out, and balance in the 
revolving fund for butter-powder cooperatives. Members of the 29 butter-
powder cooperatives received $1,470,186 from the revolving funds in 1965, 
and the balance in the funds grew to $25,014,867. The amount paid out was 
less than 6 percent of the balance in all periods, and the balance increased 
583 percent from 1950 to 1965. 
Bwter firms 
Twenty-two of the 42 butter firms revolved some capital in 1965. The 
average length of the revolving period for these cooperatives was 11.1 years. 
This is 1.4 years longer than the average revolving period for butter-powder 
l"irms. Table 19 shows a frequency distribution of the length of the revolving 
period for butter firms. 
The shortest revolving period for a butter firm was 8 years and the longest 
17 years. The most common length of the revolving period was 13 years. 
How many butter cooperatives revolved regularly during the study period? 
fable 20 presents the revolving finance pattern of the 42 butter cooperatives. 
In 1950, eight of the 42 firms paid out some capital, and in 1965, 22 
!)aid out capital. This is a significant improvement in the number of plants 
making revolving payments. 
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Table 18. Amount added, amount paid out, and balance in the revolving 
fund, 29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 6 selected years 
Item 1950 1961 1962 
(dollars) 
Amount added .............. 401,933 2,725,389 3,023,403 
Amount paid out .... ' ....... 259,220 829,512 1,080,351 
Balance''' ........... 3,662,430 18,492,828 20,373,158 
Item 1963 1964 1965 
Amount added ......... 2,641,651 2,971,547 2,784,147 
Amount paid out ........ 961,097 956,204 1,470,186 
Balance ............ 22,116,215 23,866,653 25,014,867 
Source: Survey data. 
'' Balance includes minor adjustments not reflected in the table. 
Table 19. Length of revolving capital period, 22 Minnesota 
butter cooperatives, 1965 
Length of Number 
revolving of 
period cooperatives 
(years) 
8 3 
9 3 
10 3 
11 4 
12 1 
13 5 
14 1 
17 1 
Table 20. Revolving pattern, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 
6 selected years 
Number of 
cooperatives 
13 
13 
4 ................... . 
3 
2 ................... . 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1950 1961 
''' Indicates that old equities were retired that year. 
-Indicates that old equities were not retired that year. 
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1962 1963 1964 
::~ ):: ::: 
::: ::: ... 
... ... 
:;,:. ):: 
:;: ... 
::: :;: ::: 
::: 
... =~ 
1965 
"' 
. .. 
. .. 
:;: 
The average length of the revolving period for butter firms which revolved 
in 1950 was 6.9 years. The average length of the revolving period for the 22 
firms which revolved in 1965 was 11.1 years, an increase of over 4 years 
during the study period. Like butter-powder firms, butter firms are allowing 
the length of the revolving fund to increase. 
No relationship existed between size of butter cooperatives and the length 
of their revolving periods. The average lengths of the revolving periods for the 
four groups, from small to large, were 11.0, 11.0, 10.3, and 12.3 years. 
Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference between these means 
at the .05 level of significance. 
Members of the 42 butter cooperatives received $320,344 from the re-
volving funds in 1965, and the balance in these funds increased to $8,5 68,018. 
Table 21 presents the amount added, amount paid out, and balance in the 
revolving fund for butter cooperatives during 6 selected years. 
Summary 
In terms of the three rna jor principles of revolving fund financing (see 
page 8), Minnesota dairy cooperatives comply closely with the first two, 
but not so closely with the third. The revolving fund in these cooperatives 
has been successful in obtaining capital from members in proportion to their 
use of the cooperative and in accumulating capital over time. However, the 
revolving fund generally has not been effective in continuously retiring the 
oldest outstanding equity. Only 38 percent of the sample cooperatives re-
volved capital in all of the last 5 years of the study period, and one-third did 
not revolve any capital during this period. This means that much of the capital 
used for financing the sample firms was not furnished by current patrons. 
Moreover, the situation does not appear to improve over time. Since 1950, 
the average length of the revolving period has increased for both types of 
firms. Even the firms which are revolving are having difficulty retaining suf-
ficient earnings to meet current requirements and revolve old equities. 
Table 21. Amount added, amount paid out, and balance in the revolving 
fund, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 6 selected years 
-------------------~-- ---- --·----~-
------~-~---------- ----·--
Item 1950 1961 1962 
(dollars) 
Amount added 148,114 756,256 905,164 
Amount paid out 56,853 214,698 264,820 
Balance''' 1,969,702 6,611,158 7,565,096 
Item 1963 1964 1965 
Amount added 735,974 740,180 710,031 
Amount paid out 312,829 318,707 320,344 
Balance .... 7,737,256 8,189,869 8,563,018 
Source: Survey data-
Balance includes minor adjustments not re~lected in the table-
To the extent that the cooperative pays its patronage refund in cash or 
revolves its retained refunds regularly, the member may consider this an addi-
tion to price. Thus, the economic effect of a revolving plan which operates 
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irregularly or not at all is that of reducing the net price received by members. 
Long and irregular revolving periods may discourage members and ultimately 
lead to a decrease in patronage and volume received. 
The limitations of the revolving fund are emphasized to show that co-
operatives should not rely completely on this method for obtaining their 
equity capital. The availability and costs of other sources of capital also 
should be evaluated. 
Growth of Assets and Net Worth 
Many cooperative leaders believe that inadequate equity capital limits 
cooperative growth. They contend that asset requirements of cooperatives are 
growing more quickly than net worth and that, unless members will provide 
their cooperatives with more equity capital, the growth potential of coopera-
tives will be restricted. This is based on the role of net worth capital described 
below. 
The capital of a business may be divided into owned capital and borrowed 
capital. The owned capital is the net worth or equity capital. In other words, 
net worth is the risk capital provided by the owners of a business. 
Why is net worth capital important to a business? A certain amount of 
net worth capital usually is required for obtaining debt capital. 
From a creditor's viewpoint, the higher the percentage of capital (assets) 
financed by owned capital the better. The creditor regards owner equity as a 
protection from loss. For example, if the debt is 20 percent of the assets, 
assets in liquidation could shrink to one-fifth of the balance sheet value and 
still be adequate to cover debt claims. Other factors which affect the debt 
capacity of firms will be discussed later. 
The purpose of this part of the analysis is to test the hypothesis that the 
growth of equity capital limits the growth of Minnesota dairy cooperatives. 
The growth rate of assets relative to net worth was analyzed. 
Total assets and net worth data for the sample firms were obtained for the 
10-year period 1955 to 1965. Linear trend lines were fitted to determine the 
rate of increase of assets and net worth over time. When time series data are 
considered, the normal assumptions of linear regression may not be met. 
Specifically, there is a high probability of autocorrelation which will result in 
underestimates of the standard error of the regression coefficients. In this 
study, however, the T test for the significance of the regression coefficients 
resulted in such large T values that it seems that a significant linear relation-
ship exists between assets and net worth and time. 
Asset-net worth relationship- butter-powder firms 
The equations showing the relationship of assets and net worth over time 
for butter-powder firms follow. In these equations, T is time in years (1955 
= 0) ; the numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the b coefficients. 
All b's were significantly different from zero at the . 01 level of significance: 
Assets = 22.45 + 2.05 T 
(.14) 
Net Worth= 13.80 + 1.61 T 
(.02) 
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Between 1955 and 1965, butter-powder firms' assets trended upward at 
an annual rate of $2.05 million, and net worth trended upward at an annual 
rate of $1.61 million (see figure 2). From 1955 to 1965, assets increased 
at an annual average rate of 8.3 percent, and net worth increased at an an-
nual average rate of 10.6 percent. 
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Figure 2. Trend value of total assets and net worth, 29 Minnesota butter-
powder cooperatives, 1955 to 1965. 
Table 22 shows the trend values of net worth and total assets and net 
worth as a percentage of total assets for butter-powder firms. Net worth as a 
percentage of total assets increased from 61.5 in 1955 to 69.6 percent in 1965. 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Table 22. Trend values of total assets, net worth, and net worth 
as a percentage of total assets, 29 Minnesota butter-powder 
cooperatives, 1955 to 1965 
Total 
assets 
(millions of dollars) 
Net 
worth 
22.45 13.80 
24.50 15.41 
26.55 17.02 
28.60 18.63 
30.65 20.24 
32.70 21.85 
34.75 23.46 
36.80 25.07 
38.85 26.68 
40.90 28.29 
42.95 29.90 
Net worth as 
percentage of 
total assets 
61.5 
62.9 
64.1 
65.1 
66.0 
66.8 
67.5 
68.1 
63.7 
69.2 
69.6 
Source: Survey data. 
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Assets-net worth relationship- butter firms 
The equations showing the relationship of assets and net worth over time 
for butter firms are: Assets= 7.51 + .73 T 
(.02) 
Net Worth= 5.49 + .53 T 
(.01) 
Between 1955 and 1965, butter firms' assets trended upward at an annual 
rate of $.73 million and net worth trended upward at annual rate of $.53 
million (see figure 3). From 1955 to 1965, assets and net worth increased 
at an annual average rate of 8.8 percent. 
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Figure 3. Trend value of total assets and net worth, 42 Minnesota butter 
cooperatives, 1955 to 1965. 
Table 23 shows the trend values of net worth and total assets and net 
worth as a percentage of total assets for the butter firms. Net worth as a per-
centage of total assets increased from 73.1 percent in 1955 to 73.3 percent 
in 1965. 
Sunzmary 
From 1955 to 1965, net worth as a proportion of total assets increased 
for both types of firms, and in 1965, over two-thirds of the assets of these 
cooperatives were financed with net worth capital. Based on this information, 
the hypothesis that assets are increasing faster than net worth for Minnesota 
dairy cooperatives was rejected. Even by the conservative rule of thumb that 
two-thirds of assets should be financed by equity capital, Minnesota dairy 
cooperatives were in sound financial condition. 
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Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Table 23. Trend values of total assets and net worth and net worth 
as a percentage of total assets, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 
1955 to 1965 
Total 
assets 
......... ' ... 7.51 
............ 8.24 
......... 8.96 
............ 9.69 
10.41 
11.14 
. . . . . . . . . 11.86 
12.59 
......... 13.31 
......... 14.04 
14.76 
Net 
worth 
(millions of dollars) 
5.49 
6.02 
6.56 
7.09 
7.62 
8.16 
8.69 
9.22 
9.75 
10.29 
10.82 
Net worth as 
percentage of 
total 
73.1 
73.1 
73.2 
73.2 
73.2 
73.2 
73.2 
73.3 
73.3 
73.3 
73.3 
Source: .Survey data. 
MEASURING THE COST OF CAPITAL 
A method for measuring the cost of capital for Minnesota dairy coopera-
tives will be developed in this section. The cost of each source of capital will 
be considered, and a weighted average cost of capital for Minnesota dairy 
cooperatives will be calculated. Based on the relative cost of each source of 
capital, we will try to determine if Minnesota dairy cooperatives can lower 
the cost of capital by varying their capital structure. 
Cost of Equity Capital 
Retained earnings 
It has been asserted frequently that retained earnings are a "free" source 
of capital. This mistaken conception seems to rest on the assumption that the 
cooperative is separate from its members and that it costs the cooperative 
nothing to withhold earnings from them. Retained earnings, however. do in-
volve a cost to members. The cost is the return that members would other-
wise earn by using these funds in alternative investments. Because we assume 
that cooperatives try to maximize return to members, we must measure the 
cost of retained earnings as the member's opportunity cost. 
What is the opportunity cost of capital on a Minnesota dairy farm? In 
other words, what rate of return could be earned on an additional unit of 
available capital? Obviously, this varies from farm to farm because farms vary 
considerably in kinds and quantities of resources. The only way to get a per-
fect answer would be to estimate the marginal value product of capital on 
each farm. Unfortunately, no studies of the returns to capital on Minnesota 
dairy farms have been conducted. Using the linear programming technique 
of analysis, Taylor found that the returns to capital on large representative 
southwestern Minnesota dairy farms ranged from 16 to 56 percent under vary-
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ing conditions.n Studies in the Michigan thumb area have estimated the re-
turn to capital on dairy farms to range from 10 to 20 percent at the margin.16 
This study will use the price that Minnesota dairymen pay for their short-
term debt capital as the minimum opportunity cost on capital. The use of the 
price of short-term debt as opposed to long-term capital is justifiable on 
the following grounds. The annual amount of patronage refund for each 
member, in most cases, is likely to be several hundred dollars rather than 
several thousand dollars. Therefore, it is logical that the patronage refund is 
a replacement for short-term debt rather than long-term debt. 
Most dairy farmers have short-term debts. The 1960 Sample Survey of 
Agriculture conducted by the Bureau of Census showed that over three-fifths 
of the nation's dairy farmers reported having non-real estate debt. The av-
erage debt per farm for these farmers was $9,612_17 Because most dairy 
farmers have some debt, any earnings the cooperative returns to them could 
be used to retire some debt or to avoid incurring additional debt. 
It is not easy to estimate the cost of short-term credit. Secondary sources 
report the amount of non-real estate credit from commercial banks and pro-
duction credit associations, but they do not report the interest rates. The 
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Saint Paul reports that the average rate 
charged by Minnesota's 21 Production Credit Associations was 6.5 percent 
in 1965. Production Credit Association borrowers must purchase stock in the 
association equal to 5 percent of their loans. Considering this, the effective 
rate on Production Credit Association loans is 6.8 percent. Most associations 
charge an additional fee based upon the size of loan and local conditions. 
Since the fee varies among associations and with the size of loan, it is diffi-
cult to estimate its effect on the cost of a Production Credit Association loan. 
It would raise the effective rate higher than 6.8 percent, however. 
Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis reveals that the 
average cost of commercial bank non-real estate credit to dairy farmers for 
1965 was 6.91 percent.18 This information, from a random sample of Minne-
sota commercial banks, is based on the loans these banks made to 226 dairy 
farmers in Minnesota. 
With the volume of Production Credit Association loans and short-term 
farm loans made by commercial banks in Minnesota, this information permits 
the determination of the weighted cost of the two major components of non-
real estate debt (table 24). 
Assuming that the relationship of commercial bank credit to Production 
Credit Association is the same for dairy farmers as for all farmers, the cost 
of retained earnings is about 6.9 percent. 
15 Donald C. Taylor, Income Improving Adjustment and Normative Responses for Hogs and Beef 
in Southwestern Minnesota, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, August 1965, 
p. 152. 
1a J. R. Brake, Financing Michigan Farms: The Thumb, Research Report No. 1, Michigan State 
University Agricultural Experiment Station, p. 16. 
11 "Dairy Farmer Indebtedness," Monthly Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
August 1963, p. 13. 
1s Unpublished study of commercial bank loans to farmers, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
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Table 24. Amount of non-real estate debt and rate of interest 
paid, Minnesota farmers, 1965 
Source Amount 
(dollars) 
Commercial banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344,201,000 
P.C.A. 98,633,000 
Weighted average cost ...... . 
Source: Agricultural Finance Review, Volume 26, Supplement, February 1966. 
Rate 
(percent) 
6.91 
6.80 
6.89 
This estimate does not include a component for credit extended to farmers 
by retailers because no composite data on the amount and cost of merchant 
credit are available. Merchant credit is recognized as one of the most expen-
sive sources of credit, however. Thus, if merchant credit were included, it 
would raise the estimate. 
What is the significance of this cost of retained earnings to the cooperative 
manager and farmer member? To the cooperative manager and board of di-
rectors, it means (assuming that their objective is to maximize returns to 
members) that the cooperative should not retain member earnings unless they 
can earn at least 6.9 percent 10 on their earnings. Also, if a cooperative has 
other sources of capital available at a lower cost, it should exhaust those 
sources before using retained earnings. 
Rate of return on equity capital 
Cooperative leaders often criticize members who are reluctant to invest 
in their cooperatives. These leaders claim that the cooperative earns more on 
capital than the individual farmer can earn on his farm capital and that the 
farmer should be happy to invest in the cooperative. This is true in some, 
but not all, cases. Often the time value of money is not considered. Net mar-
gin as a percentage of total equity is computed and taken as a measure of 
the return to members. For example, if net margins are $150,000 and total 
equity is $1,000,000, the member's return on equity is 15 percent regardless 
of when the members actually receive the net margin. This assumes that a 
dollar received in 1 year or 10 years is equivalent in value to a dollar received 
today. However, assuming time preference and a positive interest rate, a dollar 
received today is worth more than one received in the future. The dollar can 
be spent now with greater satisfaction or invested to return more than a dollar 
in the future. A member of a cooperative which revolves funds does not re-
ceive all of his share of the net margin in cash in the year it is earned. 
Thus, a valid measurement of the member's rate of return on equity must 
consider the time value of money. 
The present value of a sum to be received in the future can be determined. 
Given an interest rate, the future sum is discounted at that rate for the appro-
priate number of periods. The process of discounting is more easily explained 
by looking at compounding or cumulating. At an annual interest rate of 10 
10 For ease of computation, this figure will be rounded to 7.0 percent throughout the analysis. 
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percent , $ 100 invested today will cumulate to $ 110 at the end of 1 year, $ 121 
at the end of 2 years, etc. The genera l formu la for the future va lue of a 
present sum , P , is: 
Future value = P (1 + i) " where 
i = interest rate 
n = number of periods 
The present va lue or discounting formula is derived eas ily from thi s. 
p 
Present va lue = ( 1 + i ) " 
Thus, at an interest rate of 7 percent, the present va lue of 100 to be re-
ceived 10 years hence is: 
$100 
(1 + .07)10 = $50.83 
If a cooperative is on a 1 0-year revolving plan, it wil l be 10 yea rs later 
before the member rece ives hi s share of any given year's ea rnings which are 
added to the revolvi ng fund. Thus, to determine the return on his investment, 
a member has to discount his share of the earnings by the length of time these 
ea rnings are retained in the revolving fund. 
To determine the effect a revo lving fund has on the rate of return on a 
cooperative member's equity capita l, the following procedure was used. The 
length of each firm's revo lving period was determined, and the amount added 
to the revolving fund in a given year ( 1965) was discounted at a rate of 7 
percent for this period. Added to thi s amount were the cash di stribution of 
Local dairy cooperat ives hold large amounts of securities issued by the 
regional cooperatives with which they do business. 
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net margins, dividends on stock, and any other immediate pay-out of net 
margins. The resultant figure was divided by total equity of the cooperative 
to determine the rate of return on equity capital. Tables 25 and 26 show the 
results. If a cooperative had never revolved, it was assumed that the present 
value of funds added to the "revolving fund" was zero. Ten butter-powder 
and 13 butter cooperatives had IJever revolved capital (refer back to tables 
17 and 20). 
Table 25 shows the return rate for butter-powder firms when the net 
margin is computed as a percentage of equity assuming immediate cash dis-
tribution of the net margin. Table 26 shows the same information when the 
proportion of net margin added to the revolving fund is discounted by the 
length of the revolving period. 
Table 25. Rate of return on equity assuming immediate cash 
distribution, 29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 1965 
Size 
group 
II 
Ill 
IV 
No. of firms 
7 
9 
6 
7 
<5 
5 
4 
Rate of return (percent) 
5-10 10-15 15-20 > 20 
(No. of firms) 
2 
2 2 1 
1 3 2 
2 1 1 3 
''' Significant di~ference among means at the .05 level of significance. 
Average''' 
4.7 
7.4 
12.9 
16.7 
Table 26. Discounted rate of return on equity assuming delayed cash 
distribution, 29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 1965 
Size 
group 
II 
Ill 
IV 
No. of 
firms 
7 
9 
6 
7 
<5 
6 
6 
1 
2 
Rate of return (percent) 
5-10 10-15 15-20 >20 
(No. of firms) 
1 
2 1 
4 1 
1 2 1 1 
'''Significant difference among means at the .05 level of significance. 
Average'' 
2.8 
5.0 
7.0 
11.3 
There is a direct relationship between the firm's size and return rate both 
before and after the discounting procedure. The return rate increases with 
the size of the firm. However, ;hen the time value of money is considered. 
the return to equity from the farmers' viewpoint is reduced substantially. 
Before discounting, the average returns for butter-powder firms range from 
a low of 4. 7 percent for Group I to a high of 16.7 percent for Group IV firms. 
After discounting, the low is 2.8 percent and the high 11.3 percent. 
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Even before discounting, 13 butter-powder firms, or 44 percent, earned 
less than 6.9 percent on their equity in 1965. After discounting, 18, or 52 
percent, earned less than 6.9 percent on their equity. Before discounting, 
three Group IV cooperatives had a return to equity of more than 20 percent. 
After discounting, only one plant had a return of greater than 20 percent. 
With this in mind, one can understand the farmers' reluctance to make addi-
tional investment in certain cooperatives. 
Tables 27 and 28 show the comparable data for the 42 butter firms. 
Again, a direct relationship between size and return is obvious -return in-
creases as the size of firm increases. The average rate of return ranged from 
6.8 percent for Group I associations to 14.6 percent for Group IV firms 
before discounting and from 3.8 percent to 8.4 percent for the same groups 
after discounting. 
Before discounting, 15 butter cooperatives, or 3 6 percent, earned a return 
rate of 6.9 percent or less. After discounting, 28, or 67 percent, earned a 
return rate on equity of less than the farmers' opportunity costs. 
Size 
group 
II 
Ill 
IV 
Table 27. Return rate on equity assuming immediate cash 
distribution, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 1965 
No. of Rate of return (percent) 
firms <5 5-10 10-15 15-20 > 20 
(No. of firms) 
12 5 4 3 
12 5 2 3 2 
12 2 4 4 2 
6 1 2 1 2 
Average''' 
6.8 
8.3 
9.7 
14.6 
'''Significant difference among means at the .05 level of significance. 
Table 28. Discounted return rate on equity assuming delayed 
cash distribution, 42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 1965 
No. of Rate of return (percent) Size 
group firms <5 5-10 10-15 15-20 >20 Average''' 
II 
Ill 
IV 
12 
12 
12 
6 
9 
6 
7 
4 
(No. of firms) 
3 
5 1 
5 
"Significant difference among means at the .05 level of significance. 
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3.8 
4.5 
4.6 
2 8.4 
We know that the average length of the revolving fund is increasing over 
time and that there is no certainty that the cooperative will continue to re-
volve regularly. In this analysis we have assumed that the length of the revolv-
ing fund will remain the same over time. It was not deemed necessary to enter 
a discount factor to account for the uncertainty of future returns. If these 
factors were considered, of course, the discount rate to compute the present 
value of the revolving stream would be higher than 6.9 percent. 
At a discount rate of 7 percent, the present value of $1 added to a 10-
year revolving fund is $.51. This emphasizes the importance of a short and 
regular revolving period. It is easy to see how a long or irregularly revolving 
capital plan can undermine a member's confidence in his cooperative. Mem-
bership in a cooperative with a long revolving fund period, all other coopera-
tive services being equal, is less valuable than membership in a cooperative 
with a short revolving period. 
Cost of Alternative Sources of Capital 
The cost of retained earnings is of practical significance to the cooperative 
manager and directors who should try to obtain the least cost capital struc-
ture. If capital sources at a lower cost than retained earnings are available, 
the cooperative should use these sources. 
Common stock 
For purposes of the analysis, the cost of common stock is considered to 
be the same as retained earnings. To belong to a dairy cooperative in Minne-
sota, a farmer generally must purchase at least one share of common stock. 
To do this, he must divert capital from alternate uses. Thus, the relative cost 
is the member's opportunity cost. 
Preferred stock 
The most common dividend rate on the preferred stock of dairy coopera-
tives in Minnesota is 5 percent. Other costs are involved with the issue of 
preferred stocks. For nonexempt associations an income tax liability is associ-
ated with preferred stock, but since the majority of Minnesota dairy coopera-
tives are tax exempt, this cost usually is zero. Thus, the cost of preferred stock 
to these firms will be assumed to be 5 percent. 
Cost of Debt Capital 
Minnesota dairy cooperatives use debt capital extensively. In 1965, 24 of 
the 71 sample firms initiated a loan. Table 29 shows the sources of these 
loans. Half of the loans made were from the Banks for Cooperatives. Approxi-
mately 60 percent of loans by regional cooperatives were obtained from the 
Bank for Cooperatives. 20 An average of the rates charged by all sources of 
debt capital could be used as the cost of debt capital. Because the Bank for 
Cooperatives is clearly the major source of debt capital and was created 
specifically to provide debt capital for cooperatives, its rate will be used as 
the cost of debt. 
"''Nelda Griffin, Financial Structure of Regional Farmer Cooperatives, Farmer Cooperative Service, 
General Report No. 133, p. 31. 
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Table 29. Source of loans initiated by 24 Minnesota dairy 
____ ~()_<>peratives, 1965 
Source 
Bank for Cooperatives 
Commercial banks 
Other cooperatives 
Individuals .. 
Life insurance 
Source: Survey data. 
================== 
No. of firms 
12 
7 
2 
2 
1 
No. of loans 
14 
7 
4 
2 
1 
The rate charged by the St. Paul Bank for Cooperatives in 1965 was 5 
percent. Because this rate has changed, some may argue that the analysis is 
no longer valid. The interest rates (Production Credit Association, commercial 
bank, and Banks for Cooperatives) which affect this analysis tend to move 
together, however. When interest rates rise, the cost of debt rises. But the 
cost of equity also rises. Because the data for this study extended only to 
1965, interest rates which prevailed in 1965 were used. We assume, however, 
that the relationships established in this study are valid for varying interest 
rates. 
Cost of Capital for the Sample Firms 
Having established the cost of each item in the capital structure, the next 
step is to determine the total cost of capital of the sample firms. This is neces-
sary to determine if these cooperatives are using the least-cost capital struc-
ture. Because no significant relationship exists between size groups and capital 
structure, no significant difference in the cost of capital exists among size groups. 
There is, however, a significant difference in the capital structure and, thus, 
in the cost of capital between butter-powder and butter firms. Tables 30 and 
31 present the capital structure and the weighted average cost of capital for 
the two types of firms. The weighted average cost of capital was 6.44 percent 
for butter-powder firms and 6.61 percent for butter firms. In 1965, the pri-
mary difference between the two capital structures was that butter-powder 
cooperatives had a much large·r proportion of their capital in preferred stock 
than did butter firms. On a 5-year average, there was a significant difference 
between several items in the capital structure (see table 9). 
Leverage and the Cost of Capital 
Can the sample firms lower the cost of capital by changing their capital 
structure? Because debt capital is one of the lowest cost sources of capital 
available, the firms obviously can lower the cost of capital by using as mucl1 
more debt as they can without undue risk to the equity holders. An ade-
quate supply of equity capital allows a company to increase its earnings 
through the use of debt. This is referred to as leverage or trading on th•: 
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Table 30. Weighted average cost of capital, 29 Minnesota 
=========b=u=tt=er-powder cooperatives, 1965 
Weighted cost 
Proportion (product or 
Item of total Cost columns 1 & 2) 
(percent) 
Common stock 1.2 6.9 .0828 
Preferred stock 13.9 5.0 .6950 
Patron's equity reserve 70.9 6.9 4.8921 
General reserve 4.5 6.9 .3105 
Term debt 9.5 5.0 .4550 
Total 100.0 6.4354 
Source: Survey data. 
Table 31. Weighted average cost of capital, 42 Minnesota butter 
cooperatives, 1965 
Weighted cost 
Proportion (product of 
Item of total Cost columns 1 & 2) 
(percent) 
Common stock 2.0 6.9 .1380 
Preferred stock 6.3 5.0 .3150 
Patron's equity reserve 76.2 6.9 5.2578 
General reserve 6.5 6.9 .4485 
Term debt 9.0 5.0 .4500 
Total 100.0 6.6093 
Source: Survey data. 
equity because the supply of equity capital permits the firm to obtain addi-
tional capital. There is, of course, a limit on the extent to which leverage may 
be employed. The greater the proportion of earnings committed to servicing 
debt, the greater the risk that no earnings will remain for the equity holders 
if earnings decrease. Also, the more fixed charges against earnings, the higher 
the risk to the lender. 
Usc of debt hy the sample firms 
The extent to which the sample cooperatives used debt during the study 
period will be covered in this section. During 1965, 24 firms initiated loans. 
The average size of these loans was $131,482 per firm. The average long-
term liability for the 29 butter-powder cooperatives increased from $55,713 
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per firm in 1950 to $94,391 in 1965. For the 42 butter cooperatives, the 
average long-term debt per firm increased from $2,223 in 1950 to $25,209 
in 1965. Long-term debt as a percentage of total assets was 6.3 percent for the 
butter-powder associations. This compares to 12.5 percent for all U. S. cor-
porations in 1964~1 and 24 percent for 448 regional cooperatives in the 
United States in 1962.~~ 
Many of the sample firms did not use any term debt. In 1965, nine butter-
powder firms and 28 butter firms had no long-term debt. Seven butter-powder 
firms and nine butter firms did not have any long-term debt during the years 
1961 and 1965. 
In recent years, some cooperatives have sold debenture bonds to raise 
capital. Six of the butter-powder firms sold some debenture bonds during the 
study period. The average rate of interest paid on these bonds was 5.4 per-
cent. None of the butter firms sold any debentures to raise capital during 
the study period. 
Factors Affecting Debt Capacity 
An examination of the capital structure and the cost of each component 
shows that the cost of capital could be lowered by using more debt capital. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the sample firms' debt capacity. 
Two methods are used commonly to measure the importance of debt in 
the capital structure of firms. ~3 One is the statement of debt as a percentage 
of total capitalization (often referred to as the debt ratio). The other method, 
called "times interest earned," relates interest to the earnings from which in-
terest must be deducted. 
Debt, however, is serviced by cash payments, and cash flow determines 
the ability of a firm to service its debt. In view of this, it is logical to develop 
a measure which relates directly to the total cash flow of debt servicing. This 
measure can be called "times burden covered" ~4 where the burden is defined 
as the interest on the debt plus the payment on principal. This measure would 
appear as: 
Net funds available (earnings + depreciation) 
interest + payment on principal 
The denominator represents the earnings necessary to equal the interest plus 
principal payments, and the numerator should be some multiple of this de-
pending upon the degree of risk assumed. Net funds available are earnings 
minus all expenses 25 and noncash earnings plus depreciation. Depreciation 
"'Pearson Hunt, Charles Williams, and Gordon Donaldson, Basic Business Finance, 1966, p. 10. 
''Griffin, op. cit., pp. 8 and 30. 
"''Hunt, Williams, and Donaldson, op. cit., p. 357. 
,., Ibid., p. 237. 
'" Usually in computing net funds available all expenses except interest are deducted. However, 
because the purpose is to determine how much additional debt the cooperative can assume, 
interest expenses also were deducted. 
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expenses do not require a current outlay of funds and , thus, constitute a 
major source of fund s with which management can work. 
Estimating the Net Funds Available 
for the Sample Firms 
A 4-year average (1962-1965) of net funds availab le to the sample firm s 
was computed. Net funds available to the cooperative manager were calcu-
lated using this formu la: 
Net funds ava ilab le = net margins + depreciation 
- 80 percent of patronage 
refunds from other 
cooperatives 
- cash distributions of net 
margins 
- dividends on capital stock 
- income taxes. 
Eighty percent of patronage refunds from other cooperatives was deducted 
because receiving cooperat ives generall y report the total amount in their net 
margin but receive only 20 percent of it in cash. Dividends and income taxes 
are deducted beca use they represent a drain on the funds avai lable to the 
manager for debt servicing. 
Cooperative securiti es are iss ued in ma ny different form s- common stock, 
preferred stock , revolving cap ital cert ifi cates, a nd other types. 
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Tables 32 and 33 show the 4-year average of the estimated net funds 
available for the sample cooperatives. The average net funds available vary 
considerably, ranging from -$10,025 to $835,912. 
No butter-powder firm had a negative average net fund available. A posi-
tive relationship exists between size of firm and average net funds available 
for butter-powder firms (table 32). The average net fund available increases 
as the size of firm increases. Average net funds available were $30,986 for 
Group I butter-powder firms and $323,333 for Group IV firms. 
Average net funds available for butter firms also increase as the size of 
firm increases (table 3 3). Average net funds available are $7,132 for Group 
I firms and $36,651 for Group IV firms. 
Group 
II 
Ill 
IV 
Table 32. Four-year average and range of net funds available per 
firm-29 Minnesota butter-powder cooperatives, 1961 to 1965 
Average net 
funds available''' 
30,986 
74,978 
110,213 
323,333 
(dollars) 
Range of 
funds available 
10,865 to 53,154 
29,199 to 151,101 
83,530 to 160,029 
181,755 to 835,912 
'''Significant difference among means at the .05 level of signi:icance. 
Group 
II 
Ill 
IV 
Table 33. Four-year average and range of net funds available per 
firm-42 Minnesota butter cooperatives, 1961 to 1965 
Average net 
funds available''' 
7,132 
7,360 
14,670 
36,651 
(dollars) 
Range of 
funds available 
-10,025 to 14,220 
- 6,126 to 19,283 
4,162 to 25,458 
9,205 to 55,396 
:) Significant difference among means at the .05 level of significance. 
Estimated Debt Capacity for the Sample Firms 
These figures of average net funds available will be used to estimate the 
debt capacity of the sample firms. In the formula: 
net funds available (earnings + depreciation) 
interest + principal 
the 4-year average of net funds available will be used. 
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The "times burden covered" concept does not have a built-in guide for 
the desirable margin of safety. In other words, what multiple of interest plus 
principal should the net funds available be? The conditions affecting the 
choice of the margin of safety are the behavior of income and the expenditures 
which cause variations in net funds available from year-to-year. If these 
variations have the potential of reducing net funds available to zero or less, 
the debt servicing will be vulnerable regardless of the margin of net funds 
available. Therefore, a realistic choice of the appropriate margin of safety 
over debt burden for a given company requires that the circumstances affect-
ing the company be examined carefully. 
The purpose of this analysis, however, is to obtain some aggregate meas-
ure of whether the sample firms have unused debt capacity. For this purpose, 
the 4-year average of net funds available will be assumed to be a reasonable 
estimate of future net funds available. A margin of safety of net funds avail-
able of two to one over interest plus principal will be taken as adequate. This 
means that net funds available could shrink by 50 percent and still cover 
interest plus principal. This margin of safety is conservative and is based on 
the average fluctuation of net funds available over the 4-year period. Rarely 
did net funds available fluctuate more than 50 percent from year-to-year. 
Using this information, the sample firms' debt capacity was estimated 
in the following way. Because a margin of safety of two to one was desired, 
a cooperative could borrow safely to the point where interest plus principal 
payments would equal half of the net funds available. Thus, if the net funds 
available were $100,000, the cooperative could afford interest and principal 
payments of $50,000. Tables 34 and 35 show the debt capacity of the sample 
firms. 
The total combined debt capacity for the sample butter-powder firms was 
$1,908,160, or an average of $65,798 per firm. The average debt capacity 
per firm ranged from $15,493 for the small firms to $162,667 for the large 
firms. The largest group of firms with the highest average debt capacity also 
had the lowest percentage of its total capital in debt. 
The total debt capacity of butter firms was $284,928, or an average of 
$6,784 per firm. The average debt capacity per firm ranged from $3,566 for 
Group I to $18,325 for Group IV. 
Table 34. Debt capacity by size groups, 29 Minnesota butter-powder 
cooperatives, 1965 
Group Total Average'~ Range 
(dollars) 
108,450 15,493 5,433 to 22,853 
II 337,401 37,489 14,599 to 75,551 
Ill ............. 330,642 55,107 41,765 to 80,015 
IV .......... 1,131,667 162,667 70,324 to 417,956 
Total ........... 1,908,160 65,798 . ..... '. 
"Significant ditterence among means at the .05 level of significance. 
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Table 35. Debt capacity by size groups, 42 Minnesota butter 
cooperatives, 1965 
Group Total Average'~ Range 
(dollars) 
............... 42,791 3,566 -5,012 to 7,710 
II ............... 44,163 3,680 -3,063 to 9,642 
Ill ............... 88,021 7,335 2,063 to 12,729 
IV ............... 109,953 18,325 4,602 to 39,516 
Total ............ 284,928 6,784 • •••••••••• 0. 
" Significant difference among means at the .05 level of significance. 
Debt Capacity of All Minnesota Butter-Powder 
and Butter Cooperatives 
The sample data were used to estimate the debt capacity of all dairy 
manufacturing cooperatives in Minnesota. The estimated total annual debt 
capacity was $3,304,306. Minnesota dairy cooperatives could assume annual 
interest plus principal payments of $3,304,306. On a 1-year basis, they could 
borrow $3,146,958. ($3,146,958 plus 5 percent of $3,146,958 equals 
$3,304,306.) If these cooperatives actually borrowed this amount for 1 year 
to replace equity capital, they would lower their cost of capital by replacing 
equity capital which costs 6.9 percent with debt capital which costs 5.0 per-
cent. Borrowing $3,146,958 and substituting it for equity capital would result 
in a savings to the members of $59,792 [.069 (3,146,958)- .05 (3,146,958)]. 
In actual practice, however, loans seldom are paid off in 1 year. Normally 
a loan is made for several years and paid back in equal annual installments 
on the principal plus interest. Thus, a more realistic estimate of the potential 
savings is the amount of debt all Minnesota dairy cooperatives could afford 
to service over a given period, for example, 5 years. On this basis, these co-
operatives could borrow $13,217,224. Interest and principal on this debt 
would amount to $3,304,306 the 1st year. This would save $241,121 per 
year [13,217,224 (.069)- 13,217,224 (.05)], or $1,205,605 over a 5-year 
period. 
The estimates of debt capacity derived in this study are realistic. The 
method used by the St. Paul Bank for Cooperatives and in this study to 
determine debt capacity are very similar. Thus, our estimates of debt capacity 
are consistent with the standards of the major credit source for Minnesota 
dairy cooperatives. 
Implications for Financial Management 
This study points to two important reasons why Minnesota dairy coopera-
tives should consider using more debt capital: 1) the Bank for Cooperatives 
offers debt capital at a rate less than the farmer's opportunity cost on capital; 
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2) Minnesota dairy cooperatives are having trouble maintaining the revolving 
fund method of financing. Many firms have never revolved their capital, and 
the length of the revolving period is increasing over time. Using more debt 
capital may help to ease this problem. 
Erdman and Larsen~n discuss combining some form of permanent debt or 
interest bearing securities with the revolving fund. Under such a plan, only 
part of a firm's capital would be handled on a revolving basis. The remainder 
might consist of some intermediate- or long-term credit instrument subject to 
periodic renewal, preferred stock, or other nonvoting securities. Combining 
some permanent debt financing with the revolving fund method would mean 
that members would not need to invest as much of their capital in the co-
operative. 
Employing more debt would mean several things to cooperatives. Such a 
policy would require more careful financial planning and control. One feature 
of the revolving fund is its ease, simplicity, and economy in obtaining capital. 
Retaining the earnings and informing each member of his share is relatively 
simple and has encouraged the use of this method of financing. However, if 
more debt is used, long-run financial plans for the cooperative must be formu-
lated for the manager to know when to expect unusually large cash drains 
from the cooperative. The manager also must make estimates of sales and 
expenses and of the cash flow into and out of the business to know how much 
money is available to service the debt. 
Secondly, a policy of using more debt could increase a cooperative's busi-
ness volume. As previously mentioned, many sample firms had never revolved 
any capital, and the length of the revolving period has increased substantially 
since 1950. Use of more debt capital could help many cooperatives to revolve 
more regularly and faster. Receipt of a patronage refund is a primary benefit 
of cooperative membership. A cooperative which revolves patronage refunds 
regularly and in a short time increases the value of this facet of cooperative 
membership and makes cooperative membership more attractive. Thus, a co-
operative using debt to shorten its revolving period could expect a greater 
volume of business and lower operating costs. ~• 
Increased use of debt by cooperatives may have a beneficial effect on 
market performance. Heimberger has demonstrated ~s that an open member-
ship cooperative improves market performance. This is theoretically true be-
cause a cooperative returns everything above cost to its members. Thus, any 
competing firm must pay a price for raw materials (milk) equal to the price 
paid by the cooperative plus patronage refund. However, the cooperative's 
effect on market performance is reduced substantially if it never revolves its 
capital or if the revolving period is so long that the present value of revolving 
Erdman and Larsen, op. cit., pp. 89-91. 
'"Studies of the Minnesota dairy manufacturing industry have shown that operating costs de-
crease as s1ze of 9perat10n mcreases. For example, see James W. Gruebele, Changing Market 
Structure of the Mmnesota Dairy Manufacturing Industry, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University 
of M1nnesota, 1965, pp. 109·112. 
"Peter G. Heimberger, "Cooperative Enterprise as a Structural Dimension of Farm Markets," 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLVI, August 1964, p. 603. 
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capital is too small to influence producers' decisions as to where to market 
their products.~9 It may increase a cooperative's effect on market performance 
to use debt to enable it to revolve capital faster. 
Implications for resource allocation 
So far the cost of capital has been considered as it affects the financing 
decision rather than the investment decision. The firm was assumed to have 
profitable investment opportunities, and the problem was to decide which 
sources of capital to use to finance investments. The cost of capital also has 
important implications for the investment decision. 
Theoretically, a firm will invest to the point where the marginal rate of 
return on the investment equals the marginal cost of capital. If cooperatives 
underestimate the cost of capital by assuming the cost of retained earnings 
to be zero, too many resources may be invested in cooperative enterprises. 
With the cost of retained earnings at 7 percent, the cooperative should not 
retain earnings to invest in any project with a return rate of under 7 percent. 
However, if the cooperative considers the cost of retained earnings to be zero, 
it may make investments which yield less than 7 percent to the extent that 
retained earnings are available. 
Available figures suggest that too many resources may be invested in local 
dairy cooperatives in Minnesota. For example, in a study of Minnesota dairy 
manufacturing firms, Kerchner concluded that the capacity of these firms was 
not utilized fully even in the flush milk production period. 30 
Further research is needed on the investment decisions of cooperatives. 
However, recognition by cooperatives that retained earnings do have a cost 
may lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigated the present methods of financing dairy cooperatives 
in Minnesota to see if the cooperatives use the least cost capital structure. 
Minnesota dairy cooperatives were divided into two groups -butter-powder 
firms and butter firms. From a total of 46 butter-powder cooperatives and 
246 butter cooperatives, stratified, random samples of 29 butter-powder firms 
and 42 butter firms were selected. Extensive financial data for the years 1950, 
1955, and 1961 through 1965 were obtained from each firm. 
Cooperatives have distinctive objectives and operational techniques. Three 
main principles normally listed as unique to cooperatives are: ( 1) operate 
at cost, ( 2) limited returns on capital, and ( 3) democratic control by mem-
bers. These principles affect the ability of cooperatives to raise capital by sell-
""For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see Ronald D. Knutson, "Cooperatives and the 
Competitive Ideal," Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 48, August 1966, pp. 111·117. 
ao Orval G. Kerchner, Economic Aspects of Flexible Dairy Manufacturing Plants, Minnesota Agri-
cultural Experiment Station Bulletin 487. 
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ing capital stock. For example, to operate at cost, cooperatives distribute 
their earnings on the basis of patronage rather than investment. Therefore, 
no potential exists for capital appreciation with cooperative stock. In addition, 
limited returns to capital and democratic control detract from the marketability 
of cooperative stock. 
No significant relationship exists between size of firm and capital struc-
ture for either type of firm. The two types of firms showed significant differ-
ences in capital structures. Butter-powder firms had more of their capital in 
preferred stocks than did butter firms. Butter firms had a larger proportion 
of their capital structure in revolving funds than did butter-powder firms. 
Butter firms also used less debt capital than butter-powder firms. 
During the study period, both common and preferred stock decreased in 
importance for both types of firms. The role of common stock declined partly 
because the par value of the stock of these cooperatives declined significantly 
between 1950 and 1965. 
Equity as a percentage of the total capital for butter-powder firms in-
creased in every period of the study except 1965. The largest source of equity 
capital was retained earnings. These earnings are allocated to each patron 
and added to the patron's equity reserve account, which is handled on a re-
volving basis. In 1965, patron's equity reserves as a percentage of total capital 
were 70.9 percent for butter-powder firms and 75.0 percent for butter firms. 
Cooperatives rely on retained earnings as a source of capital for several 
reasons. Certain cooperative principles limit their ability to raise capital by 
selling stock. In addition, members should help finance their cooperatives on 
a basis proportional to patronage. Retaining earnings and allocating them to 
patrons is a simple way to raise capital. Also, because most cooperatives do 
not pay dividends on retained earnings, the explicit costs of retained earnings 
are less than for other sources of capital. Added to the ease with which earn-
ings may be retained, this encourages the use of retained earnings as a source 
of capital. 
The use of long-term debt relative to retained earnings increased in every 
period of the study for butter firms and between 1964 and 1965 for butter-
powder firms. Three factors could account for this change: ( 1) decreased 
rate of earnings, (2) increased cash payout of earnings, or ( 3) increased 
investment per dollar of sales. Of the three, increased cash payout of earnings 
was most responsible for the decline in retained earnings relative to debt. 
This was due primarily to the 1962 Internal Revenue Act, which required 
cooperatives to distribute at least 20 percent of their patronage refunds in 
cash to be tax deductible. 
All of the sample firms use the revolving fund method of financing. How-
ever, only 40 of the 71 sample firms actually revolved capital in 1965. The 
average length of the revolving period in 1965 was 10.71 years. Between 
1950 and 1965, the average length of the revolving period increased for both 
types of firms. 
Theoretically, the revolving plan provides a method to obtain adequate 
capital and retire member investments on an orderly basis without disturbing 
the cooperative's financial condition. However, the significant lengthening of the 
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revolving period shows that, in actual practice, other factors frequently take 
priority over revolving old equities. One such factor is paying current mem-
bers higher product prices. Increased competition for the available supply 
of milk forces some cooperatives to pay higher prices to maintain or increase 
their volume. Because paying higher prices during the year reduces net mar-
gins, it limits the cooperative's ability to revolve old equities on a regular 
schedule. The increasing length of the revolving period may cause serious 
problems for cooperatives. 
Most existing literature on cooperative finance emphasizes that coopera-
tives have difficulty obtaining adequate equity capital. Allegedly the asset 
requirements of agricultural cooperatives have been increasing faster than 
net worth capital and this is limiting the growth of cooperatives. To test the 
hypothesis that assets are increasing faster than net worth in Minnesota dairy 
cooperatives, linear trend equations were fitted to asset and net worth data for 
the years 1955 to 1965. The proportion of assets financed by net worth capital 
increased from 62 percent in 1955 to 70 percent in 1965 for butter-powder 
firms and remained constant at approximately 73 percent for butter firms. The 
hypothesis that assets are increasing faster than net worth was rejected. It was 
concluded that the growth of Minnesota dairy cooperatives was not limited by 
inadequate equity capital. 
To determine if Minnesota dairy cooperatives were using the least-cost 
capital structure, a measure of the cost of each source of capital was de-
veloped. Retained earnings constituted the largest component in the capital 
structure of the sample firms. The relevant cost for this source of capital is 
the farmer member's opportunity cost. Since most dairy farmers have short-
term debt, its cost, 6.9 percent was considered a reasonable estimate of the 
minimum opportunity cost on the farmer's capital. The cost of common and 
preferred stock was estimated at 6.9 and 5 percent, respectively. 
The rate charged by the Bank for Cooperatives, the major source of debt 
capital for Minnesota dairy cooperatives, was used as the cost of debt capital. 
The cost of retained earnings, common stock, preferred stock, and debt 
capital was used to determine the weighted cost of capital for the sample 
firms. The weighted cost of capital was 6.43 percent for butter-powder firms 
and 6.61 percent for butter firms. 
To see if the cooperative could lower the cost of capital by using more 
debt capital, the debt capacity of each sample firm was calculated and used 
to estimate the debt capacity of all Minnesota butter-powder and butter co-
operatives. 
Each firm was assumed to be able to incur debt up to where the interest 
plus principal was equal to 50 percent of net funds available. Based on this 
criterion, the annual debt capacity of all butter-powder and butter coopera-
tives in Minnesota was estimated to be $3,304,306. On a 5-year loan basis, 
these cooperatives could borrow $13,217,224. Borrowing this amount and 
substituting it for equity capital would save members $241,121 annually or 
$1,205,605 over a 5-year period. 
Because the cost of debt capital was less than the cost of retained earn-
ings and because Minnesota dairy cooperatives have unused debt capacity, 
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the hypothesis that these cooperatives could lower the cost of capital by using 
more debt was accepted. 
Based on the relative costs of debt and equity, Minnesota dairy coopera-
tives should use more long-term debt capital. This would cause a considerable 
savings in lower capital costs to cooperative members. This is true because 
the farmer member's opportunity cost on capital is higher than the cost of 
debt capital for most cooperatives. 
In addition, a cooperative which reduces the cost of capital to its mem-
bers, and thus increases the benefits of cooperative membership, could expect 
to attract additional business, causing a more efficient size of operation in 
many cases. 
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APPENDIX 
Sampling Procedure 
The cooperatives were divided into two groups - butter manufacturing 
firms and butter-dry milk manufacturing firms. (See page 4.) Within each 
group the firms were classified into four size categories, and a random sam-
ple was drawn from each category. 
Butter firms were stratified on the basis of total pounds of butterfat re-
ceived. Butter firms receiving less than 500,000 pounds of butterfat annually 
were not included. These firms accounted for less than 20 percent of the total 
volume of butterfat received by all butter firms in Minnesota. Moreover, 
many firms in this size group are leaving the industry and will be even less 
important in the future. The remaining butter firms were stratified into the 
following four groups: 
Group 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
Pounds of butterfat received annually 
500,000 to 750,000 
750,000 to 1,000,000 
1,000,000 to 1,500,000 
1,500,000 and greater 
Because the trend is toward fewer and larger firms, a greater percentage 
of the firms from the larger strata were sampled. All firms in Group IV were 
sampled. The sample consisted of 42 firms of the 143 firms in the four groups. 
Butter-powder firms receive not only whole milk, but also large quantities 
of skim milk. Thus, the variable used for stratifying the butter-powder group 
was total milk solids received. Butter-powder firms were stratified into the 
following four groups: 
Group 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
Pounds of total milk solids received 
500,000 to 750,000 
750,000 to 1,000,000 
1,000,000 to 1,500,000 
1,500,000 and greater 
Of 46 cooperatively owned butter-powder firms in Minnesota, 29 were 
sampled. All firms in Group IV were sampled. 
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